I don’t think the world either wants or needs another Jose Canseco book, but it looks like we’re getting one.

I guess you have to grudgingly admit that his brazen arrogance has at least forced MLB to do something about the issue of performance-enhancing drugs. Sadly, I don’t believe for a minute that Canseco is motivated by doing things for the good of the game. The good of his ego maybe, certainly for the good of his bank balance, but not to help MLB repair its image.

Indeed, Canseco apparently believes there is absolutely nothing wrong with a professional athlete taking steroids and that the sport would be better off in allowing players to use them.

I say apparently as the above is taken from second-hand evidence. I haven’t read his “Juiced …” book, mainly because I wasn’t thrilled at the idea of lining his pockets. I can only go on what has been reported and it hasn’t exactly changed my mind over whether I want to hand over good money to read his tales of self-justification and gossip.

That his follow up book has a working title of “Vindicated” says it all. Canseco wants to right the wrongs of the Mitchell report by naming players who should have been in it. Not least of these is Alex Rodriguez. It will be interesting to see whether he has any actual evidence to back up his claims. As with most of these things, no doubt the lawyers will be the only real winners in the end.

It’s scheduled to hit the shops by opening day, just in time to take our attention away from the start of what will hopefully be another great season of baseball action. Still, it’s hard to feel too sorry for MLB. Canseco was able to earn a living playing in the Majors between 1985 and 2001 despite the fact that pretty much everyone who employed him knew he was taking steroids. Teams were still giving him a job and MLB was still happy to make money selling tickets and TV rights on the back of the exploits of Canseco and others like him.

MLB created this monster by wilfully turning a blind eye to what was going on when it suited them. Perhaps the consequences that they are dealing with now, and will continue to deal with for years to come in relation to the Hall of Fame, will prove to be the big incentive for the sport to clean up its act?

We’re a few days removed from the release of the Mitchell report. The vast amount of coverage it has received means that trying to get a sense of perspective is difficult. Everyone seems to have an agenda they are trying to pursue.

The report has polarised opinion, with some dismissing its findings as mere hearsay and some treating it as gospel. The reaction of two players named in the report shows how the issue is not nearly so black and white.

Andy Pettitte has admitted the comments about him taking HGH and Brian Roberts has also admitted trying steroids. They are interesting cases. Pettitte’s confession naturally puts the focus even more tightly on his good friend Roger Clemens while Roberts’ confession puts the focus on ESPN’s Jayson Stark. In his damning indictment of the report, Stark highlighted Roberts as being a prime case where Mitchell had no right to name the player. It will be interesting to read Stark’s thoughts now that Roberts has admitted his guilt.

It should also be noted that both Pettitte and Roberts have been quick to stress that they only briefly dabbled with PEDs (Pettite took HGH twice, while Roberts tried steroids once). If we take this at face value, how do we judge them? Can we draw a distinction between someone who made a “mistake” and quickly stopped, and someone who used PEDs on a more regular basis? Should anyone who so much as injects himself once be blacklisted as a “cheater” for ever more? Ask one hundred people and I’m sure you will get a wide variety of responses.

There are two key issues with the final report: 1) it’s far from comprehensive in terms of who may have used PEDs, and 2) most of the evidence is circumstantial at best. Anyone could have predicted these two issues would arise as soon as the Mitchell investigation was launched. MLB’s moral high ground may be dubious, but let’s not forget that distributing and obtaining PEDS was and is illegal. By their very nature, the audit trails of illegal activities are not easy to uncover.

PEDS, like any drugs, are generally distributed via networks, with a key contact and then lots of “people who know people” that make up the spider’s web. In any such investigation, your major hope is that you can infiltrate or crack one of these networks (or “rings”) and then trace your way down every avenue as far as possible. Sometimes this leads you to another network, sometimes not. Mitchell’s report predominantly draws its evidence from the Kirk Radmonski network discovered by a separate criminal investigation (which in itself begs the question “what would Mitchell have done without this breakthrough?”). What you see in the report therefore largely tells you who was linked to this network (alongside a few other cases). It is not a definitive list because producing one would be impossible: you’re not going to gain knowledge of every network. Of course, the problem with publishing a partial list is that the credibility of the exercise goes down the plughole. We all know that just because player “x” wasn’t in the report, that doesn’t mean player “x” hasn’t taken PEDs, it just means it wasn’t uncovered by the investigation. But the consequence of this is that anyone not named in the report can still be under suspicion.

Many people have criticised the circumstantial evidence that the report is based on, but isn’t that the sort of information you would expect to find in an investigation like this? You’re not going to find a receipt in Roger Clemens’ house with “1 X HGH kit” written on it. You’re not going to find a smoking gun (or a blood-stained needle) on his property, if one ever existed. In Clemens’ case, what you do have is a testimony from a former Yankees trainer, Brian McNamee, that he injected Clemens with steroids and HGH on several occasions. Considering the potential legal consequences that McNamee will face if he has lied, that’s quite compelling evidence. Is it enough to convict someone in a court of law? Certainly not (not on its own at least). So there’s a very valid argument that publishing it was wrong, but then again that doesn’t necessarily make the information untrue. Pettitte and Roberts have showed that this type of testimony can be based on facts. We cannot say that Clemens took PEDs and we cannot say that he didn’t. That’s the real outcome and in the general scheme of things it’s not very helpful.

Put it all together and we are left with a report that doesn’t conclusively prove that any of the people listed have actually used PEDs and doesn’t exonerate anyone who isn’t in the report either.

Well worth the $20m+, don’t you agree?

Beyond the section where player after player is named and shamed, there are some very valid recommendations in the report that deserve attention. The names only serve to cloud the issue, yet could the report have been published without them? I think we have to go back to the catalyst for this investigation. It has effectively been a PR exercise from the start, prompted by various scandals and the attention of Congress. MLB needed to be seen to be doing something by airing some of its dirty linen in public, putting a few scapegoats in the public firing line, and then moving on while being able to claim they had dealt with the past. In that context, producing a report without including names would have failed to quench the thirst for blood and the investigation would have been labelled as a cover up.

Which is a a real shame, because MLB would have benefited greatly from a focused investigation into the use of PEDs in baseball. Answering in detail the whys, wheres and hows would have helped to inform MLB’s future policy on tackling the issue. Sadly, I don’t believe that this is going to be the legacy of the Mitchell report.

Like every other baseball fan, I’m currently skimming through the just-released Mitchell report (pdf).  I think it’s safe to say that even the A-Rod announcement (finally confirming that he’s signed the biggest contract in sports history with the Yankees) will be pushed to one side by this story.  Millions of words will be written about the report over the next few days.  Two points have struck me the most so far:

1. That the way drugs were distributed in baseball tallied with my preconceptions.  It was very much a case of networks of players who confided in each other.  If a player wanted access to performance-enhancing drugs, he could find someone who knew a contact where he could get what he wanted.
2. That the Front Offices knew all about what was going on and were happy to discuss it amongst themselves.  The quotes from the Red Sox in November 2006 (p.267) are a good case in point.  Theo Epstein asks a scout whether he has “done any digging on Gagne?” on account of the fact that Epstein knew the Dodgers thought he was “a steroid guy”.  The scout’s response? “Some digging on Gagne and steroids IS the issue”.  These comments are particularly interesting when you consider that they obtained Gagne’s services via a trade in August this year.

Of course, the major talking point is that in pretty much every case of a player being named (from the likes of Roger Clemens to Jack Cust), they ignored the opportunity to discuss the findings with Mitchell.   That’s probably to be expected, but it leaves the players concerned open to a whole load of questions that they will struggle to dodge. 

The winter meetings in Nashville are now over. On the surface, it appears to have been more of a social event than a constructive working week.

The winter meetings are really the product of a bygone era, but I think that adds to the occasion. Never mind video conferences, e-mails, faxes or telephone calls; if you want to secretly discuss a possible blockbuster deal, where better than in a hotel swarming with reporters? I can just imagine Dave Dombrowski and Larry Beinfest trying to slip away unnoticed, hiding behind pillars, knocking bins over to trip up potential followers, before diving into a room for their covert meeting.

The way the meetings are set up nowadays, they are bound to cause disappointment among baseball fans. With so many reporters twiddling their thumbs, the rumour mill goes into overdrive with reports of possible deals flying on to the internet barely seconds after a GM is seen to briefly lock eyes with a player’s agent. Many reporters are looking back at the meetings and writing comments such as “all talk, no action”, wilfully disregarding the fact that they no doubt embellished every minor discussion in the first place. It produces lots of stories though and that’s really the point of it from a fan’s perspective.

Of course, the winter meetings didn’t pass completely without incident. Detroit and Florida made sure of that with their eight-player trade. The Tigers’ batting lineup looks a frightening prospect with Cabrera added to an already potent mix and that should help Dontrelle Willis recapture his previous form (to some degree) after a dispiriting 2007 season. As for the Marlins, they’ve picked up several talented youngsters while reducing their payroll even further. Their actions really make a mockery of Selig’s ideas of creating a competitive landscape via revenue sharing. It’s frankly wrong that a team can trade away their top players and reduce their payroll to an extent that the owner can pocket a sizeable chunk of the money that they should be spending on the team. No system is perfect, but the way in which teams can be rewarded for not trying (through revenue sharing and obtaining top draft picks) is a serious flaw that needs to be looked at. The Marlins (and MLB for that matter) are basically throwing a prolonged hissy fit because the locals won’t help to pay for a new stadium. I’m not sure how these actions are supposed to encourage them to change their minds.

Anyway, GMs and agents have departed from Nashville claiming that foundations have been laid for deals to be signed over the next couple of months (they’ve got to justify their expenses, after all). Everyone is waiting for the seemingly inevitable Santana trade before they make their moves. The Red Sox are reportedly in pole position, although I don’t know many people who believe the Yankees’ self-imposed deadline means they are now out of the running. The Mets have been mentioned as a possibility, yet whether they have enough desirable parts to compete with their rivals remains to be seen. The Dodgers are in the race as well and signing Andruw Jones perhaps increases their odds of success as it may be easier to part with Kemp and/or Ethier now. It’s a good example of how deals are not made in isolation: one move can set off a long chain of events.

Maybe a few dominoes will start to fall over the next couple of weeks before Christmas?

Details: Jose Guillen signs a three-year contract worth $36 million with the Royals.

Optimist’s argument: Strip away the bad boy image and you have yourself a very useful outfielder. Good in the field, with a strong throwing arm, and a solid corner outfielder’s bat. The Royals are trying to move forward and Guillen is the type of player they should be aiming for: a talented player with a reason for other teams to look elsewhere. His reputation as a hot-head gave the Royals a chance and they made sure they didn’t let it pass them by. It’s a slight gamble, but he performed well for the Mariners last year and if he continues in that same vein (on and off the field) he will be a big boost to a team that has been in the doldrums for far too long.

Pessimist’s argument: Guillen’s career with the Royals will begin with a fifteen-day suspension due to violating MLB’s substance abuse policy. It’s a fitting start. These charges might relate to indiscretions from a few years ago, but they add another line to the long list of reasons why you shouldn’t touch him with a barge pole. A one-year deal might be acceptable as you could push him out of the back door if/when he starts causing trouble. As it is, they’re now committed to him for three whole seasons and no team is likely to want to take on his contract if/when he outstays his welcome. The best they can hope for is that he won’t drag the team down with him.

Voice of Reason: This looks to be a decent deal for the Royals. It’s possibly a bit heavy on the financial side, but everyone said that about the Gil Meche deal last year. Meche paid back the faith GM Dayton Moore showed in him with an impressive first year and there are many reasons to suggest that Guillen will be the second Mariner in succession to come good in KC. Subject to some rapid development from Alex Gordon and Billy Butler, there’s a genuine possibility that he will be their most valuable bat in 2008 (he proved to be more valuable than any KC hitter in 2007 for a start). Most of the comments you read about Guillen put his occasional temper tantrums down to his strong desire to play, which is hardly the worst attitude to have. Certainly his previous manager, John McLaren, had nothing but good things to say about him and we all know that a bad reputation is difficult to shake regardless of whether it is still deserved. A three-year deal is a fair commitment to make, he was always going to get a multi-year deal from someone and they’ve managed to keep it down to a sensible length. All in all, the Royals have got themselves a good player who could help move them up the AL Central standings if their young players breakout in ’08.

Wider impact rating: 6. Had they been able to convince Andruw Jones to man centre field alongside him, signing Guillen would have had an even bigger impact on the fortunes of the Royals. With Jones deciding to head to the Dodgers instead, the impact of this signing will mainly be felt by those chasing Japanese import Kosuke Fukudome, whose market level has probably now been set to a touch higher than what the Royals gave Guillen.